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I. INTRODUCTION
This article deals with jazz improvisation, attempting to 
finding a way to define a model through which it could be 
conceived, developed and practiced. To begin with, we will 
investigate the traditional schema through which musical 
ontology has always considered musical entities, i.e. a pre-
scriptive one. Later on, we will focus on a dynamic concep-
tion of formula—i.e., patterns that are able to express the 
musician’s individuality in a given performative context—
and sketch the difference between figural and generative 
models. Particular emphasis will be given to the distinc-
tion between formula and mere licks, that can be defined 
as conventional, fixed and ossified formulas. In conclusion, 
we will see how jazz music can be based on a different, not 
pre-determined kind of structure, which we may call in-
formative model. This allows us to abandon an inveterate 
prejudice, i.e. that jazz is an anarchic music, and, in addi-
tion, to better understand what criteria should we refer to 
in evaluating the creativity which is at stake into a jazz per-
formance. I do not want to establish a qualitative hierarchy 
between the prescriptive and the informative model, but I 
would only like to highlight the fact that they give rise to 
different productive paths in making music.
II. MUSICAL ENTITIES WITH PRESCRIPTIVE  
 MODELS: THICKNESS AND THINNESS
It may not be true for improvisations, and it may not 
be true for certain kinds of electronic music. It may 
not be true in the absence of a notational system. 
Indeed, it may not be true for most of the world’s mu-
sic. But for a great deal of the most valued music of the 
West, since the development of a sophisticated musi-
cal notation, it seems to be true that there are musical 
works, and that there are performances of them (Kivy 
1987, p. 245). 
Kania (2014) offers us an important springboard to reflect 
on the role of the so called “high-order music ontology” 
over (approximately) the last five decades. The core ques-
tions of this philosophical area are commonly sketched as 
follows: 
• what kind of things are musical works? 
• what criteria do we need to identify and recognize them? 
• what is their mode of existence? 
As Kivy claims, it seems that the presence of an object 
called “work of art” and instances of it called “performanc-
es” is taken for granted, at least in Western music. In other 
words, if we do not suppose that these kind of things may 
have some sort of existence (concrete, abstract or fictional), 
investigating issues of music ontology could be problem-
atic, if not useless. Leaving aside the undeniable accura-
cy and depth of Kivy’s inquiries in this field, I think that 
these lines reveal something that few ontologists of music 
(in which Kivy is certainly included) are inclined to admit: 
music ontology, as it has been conceived since its birth, can 
tell us very little (i.e., “it may not be true” for too much) of 
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the musical experiences that technological, social and in-
tercultural practices enable (Born 2005). Even so called 
“comparative ontology” (Kania  2014) which tries to apply 
the categories that traditional research has developed in the 
analysis of Western classical music to other genres (such as 
rock, jazz, folk and pop), faces the same difficulties.1 As a 
consequence, many scholars have raised doubts about the 
usefulness of the notion of a work of art (Kania 2011; Brown 
1996, 2000a)2 and the philosophical tool usually linked to 
that, the type/token model.3 Others have been even more 
radical and have called into question the whole concept 
of music ontology (Thomasson 2006; Ridley  2003, 2004). 
Maybe it would be excessive and to some extent harmful to 
throw away decades of philosophical enquiry on music, but 
it is certainly true that a traditional point of view on today’s 
musical practice does not help us enough, and that the role 
of concepts such as work/performance, composition/rendi-
tion and composer/interpreter should be sharply reduced. 
This is particularly relevant in musical contexts involving 
the complex and the much debated notion of improvisation 
in which most of aforementioned high-order music ontolo-
gy assumptions seem to be lacking.4 However, before focus-
ing on improvisation, it could be useful to make explicit the 
model that underlies nearly all the ontological perspectives 
that consider the ordinary musical event as consisting in 
a more or less faithful rendition of a pre-existent entity or 
structure (Hagberg 2002, p. 189), whether or not we call it a 
work of art or not.
The model is based on a prescriptive conception of the 
musical phenomenon, according to which a performance is 
commonly intended as a rendition of a given pattern (Dodd 
2007; Kivy 1983, 2002). The way in which this pattern is in-
stantiated allows us to decide if the performance is correct 
or not. In other words, performance is a medium through 
which we can have access to a certain musical piece that is, 
in principle, detached from the specific rendition we hear 
in a particular occasion. From this perspective, the ontol-
ogy of music has developed the type/token model in order 
to preserve the identity of a musical structure despite its re-
peatability (Bertinetto 2012b) and, secondly, to justify the 
expressive freedom left to interpreters. Roman Ingarden, for 
example, intends expressive features as the result of a “fill-in 
the gaps” activity: for him, musical scores are constitutively 
partial, because it is impossible to note down every sound 
inflection on a pentagram (Ingarden 1989). Consequently, 
the main task of the interpreter is to complete the spaces 
of indetermination that musical scores open up.5 Nicholas 
Wolterstorff (1975), in turn, identifies musical artworks 
with the notion of “norm-kind”, i.e. an entity that admits 
both correct and incorrect performances. This allows 
Wolterstorff to maintain a certain degree of flexibility in 
sketching the relation between a musical artwork (a kind) 
and its performances (the tokens) (Wolterstorff 1975, p. 
131). Genuine performances do not simply instantiate the 
kind through a proper sound sequence, but are produced 
with an idea of what should be done in order to have a cor-
rect rendition of it. Wolterstorff here is claiming that de-
spite the fact that one makes every effort to obtain a correct 
performance for a particular piece, it can well happen that 
one does not succeed. Nevertheless, this does not prevent 
us from identifying our rendition as one of that musical 
artwork, i.e., of that norm-kind. Even if Wolterstorff does 
not consider correctness as a sufficient condition to produce 
genuine performance of a musical artwork,6 he maintains 
that it is at least necessary. This is particularly clear in all 
those scholars (in which Wolterstorff could be undoubtedly 
included) who see the relation between a musical piece and 
its renditions in terms of shared properties (Dodd 2007, p. 
201). Julian Dodd extends this reasoning to its most extreme 
consequence: according to him, the creative process carried 
out by an artist simply consists in selecting the properties 
that a performance must possess in order to count as a cor-
rect rendition of the composed piece. Furthermore, the only 
properties that can fulfil this task are the structural-sonic 
ones played with the timbre that the composer has previ-
ously establish: that is why Dodd’s view can be understood 
as timbral sonicism.7 It should be clear that sonicist theories, 
both pure and timbral, end up by reducing the creative pro-
cess to a matter of selection, and this “may not be true” for 
the great majority of the musical practices we come across 
in our artistic experience. 
Not only in jazz—which is commonly viewed as the “nat-
ural realm” for musical improvisation—but also in some 
contemporary classical composers such as Stockhausen and 
Cage, improvisation plays a central role in creating a mu-
sical piece.8 In all these contexts, selecting properties does 
not seem to be the most important feature, because im-
provisation is a creative activity that does not give rise to 
a re-performable entity. Stephen Davies, in his well-known 
book Musical Works and Performances, focuses on the dif-
ference between composition and improvisation:
Improvisation are not musical works, I say. Does 
this mean that improvisers are not composers? Here 
I think one can say what one likes, so long as the is-
sues are clear. It is plain that composition and impro-
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visation involve similar processes—inventing tunes, 
organizing material, trying to unify the manifold. If 
“composer” is like “swimmer” or “driver”—if it names 
the person who creates a certain kind of activity—im-
provisers are composers. On the other hand, if “com-
poser” is more like “fletcher” or “wheelwright”—if it 
names the person who creates a certain kind of prod-
uct; namely, a musical work—improvisers are not 
composers, I say (Davies 2001, p.15).
Although in this passage Davies reduces the gap between 
work/performance context and improvisational activ-
ity, there is a also prescriptive element in his conception. 
According to him, a musical artwork can be thin or thick:
If it is thin, the works’ determinative properties are 
comparatively few in number and most of the quali-
ties of a performance are aspects of the performer’s in-
terpretation, not of the work as such. The thinner they 
are, the freer is the performer to control aspects of the 
performance. […]. By contrast, if the work is thick, a 
great many of the properties heard in a performance 
are crucial to its identity and must be reproduced in 
a fully faithful rendition of the work. The thicker the 
work, the more the composer controls the sonic detail 
of its accurate instances. […]. Works of performance, 
however thick they are, are always thinner in proper-
ties than any of their accurate rendition (Davies 2001, 
p. 20).
With the thinness/thickness argument, Davies describes 
the relation between a work and its instances in terms of 
shared properties: the more features they have in common, 
the thicker a work is. But when he tries to argue that a per-
formance is always thicker than the related work, regardless 
of its thickness or thinness, Davies’ claim is more problem-
atic. In fact, there is a slight difference between referring 
thickness/thinness to a work and to a performance of it: 
if for a work being thick/thin means to be more/less bind-
ing as regards the production of instances, this couplet of 
concepts do not have exactly the same meaning when re-
ferring to performances. How is precisely a performance 
itself supposed to be binding, if its determinative proper-
ties are already established in the correspondent work? We 
can presumably say that performances of particularly thin 
works could be regarded as more relevant in assessing the 
determinative properties of the work they refer to, in com-
parison to performances of thicker works. But in a work/
performance framework, “binding” seems more appropri-
ate if related to the first, rather than to the second. To make 
a very partial proposal, it could be said that a performance 
exhibits, displays or shows some properties, and that these 
properties are liable to be indentified and evaluated accord-
ing to different criteria, depending on the musical context 
in which this performance takes place (Davies 2009). 
In improvised performances, though, the basis on which 
their features are judged is not a pre-established work, but 
a more flexible model. Despite the fact that many scholars 
recognize that it is impossible to improvise from scratch 
(see Young and Matheson, 2000; Alperson  1984, p. 22; 
Tirro 1974, p. 286) the myth of spontaneity concerning this 
kind of musical practice is far from losing its strength.9 As 
we shall say, however, the originality of an improvisation 
depends on a model,10 but we should make clear what kind 
of model we are talking about.
IV.  GENERATIVE AND FIGURAL MODEL:  
 THE MOVING FORMULA
The use of a model in jazz improvisation is constantly re-
lated to the possibility of making variations of it. Variation, 
as Giannattasio notes, could be intended as an intentional 
questioning of the form (Giannattasio 1987, pp. 239-250). 
In this huge work I processi improvvisativi nella musica. Un 
approccio globale, Vincenzo Caporaletti (2005, pp. 47-51) 
distinguishes two kinds of model: generative and figural. 
While the former offers us the constructive aspects through 
which the variation can emerge (in the most common cas-
es, they are harmony, modes and scales) (Davies 2001, p. 
12; Baker 1979, pp. 1-2)11 the latter allows us to detect the 
variation perceptually, and is often identified with a certain 
melodic-rhythmic outline, that represents a sort of spring-
board moving from which the variation is distinguishable, 
due to the fact that it comes from a “regular”, “standard” 
and clearly defined context.12 It is considerably harder to 
maintain the distinction between the two models in music 
making, since playing on a scale or mode using repeated 
items can well generate a melody, in most cases a seducing 
and attractive one, which in jazz practice is often called lick.
We could define a lick as a fixed melodic phrase, repeat-
able by the musician any time they want to make their per-
formance more fluent, recognizable and easier to memorize 
for the audience (Ware 1977, p. 15). We should make every 
effort to distinguish between the mere performative ex-
pedient, deprived of any individual touch: in other words, 
licks and formulas.13 More precisely, these are sound pat-
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terns able to connote the individual style of a musician, who 
builds them gradually up through continuous practice on 
the instrument. The fact that formulas are thought and de-
veloped in a performative context—not only repeating them 
mechanically, rather transforming them depending on the 
concrete musical situation—gives them an intrinsically dy-
namic character that is far from the concept of lick. It could 
well be that a musician uses licks in the generative process 
giving rise to a formula, especially in their apprenticeship.14 
But it is not sufficient to repeat a lick several times to make 
it become a formula.
Nevertheless, many scholars (Owens  1974; Kernfeld 1983) 
have confused the notion of a formula with that of a lick: 
they claim that without “formulas” playing jazz becomes 
nearly impossible, and this is due to the fact that there is no 
score, and musicians need to have a sort of script, allowing 
them to follow the structure of the piece being performed. 
The result of such a view is that jazz pieces literally consist of 
fixed “formulas” put together, one beside the other, and this 
is precisely the way in which Thomas Owens describes the 
creative processes followed by Charlie Parker in his improv-
isations. His study is a rich and detailed catalogue whose 
task is to store all the melodic patterns which have made 
Parker performances so remarkable. But this is not a cor-
rect point of view on Parker’s legacy, because Bird often uses 
the technique of “contrafact” to build his pieces, which con-
sists in using the same harmony changing the melody.15 It is 
clear that Owens’s “storing” activity is rather useless: firstly, 
because it would be an endless task. Secondly, because from 
this perspective Parker’s unique talent is reduced to a matter 
of mere memory, that is obviously necessary in learning to 
play jazz,16 but not sufficient. On the contrary, other schol-
ars tried to dismiss this mechanic interpretation of formula 
in jazz music: Treitler, for example, in an important study 
on Gregorian chant, connects the concept of formula with 
the notion of reconstruction:17 a formula, he claims, is far 
from being a fixed and calcified item, but is rather some-
thing flexible, borderline, “between reproduction of a fixed, 
memorized melody and the extempore invention of a new 
one” (Treitler 1975, p. 11). 
As far as melodic aspect is concerned, in such a context, 
it is really hard to use traditional musicological concepts 
as «melodic coherence (Kernfeld 1996, p. 83; Martin  1996, 
pp. 34-38). Similar notions, in fact, were elaborated in order 
to analyze the relationship between melody and harmony, 
fundamental in evaluating the rate of creativity in west-
ern classical music. But in jazz practice the story is rather 
different: here the creativity of a musician must be valued 
in terms of getting attuned to a concrete musical situation 
whose guidelines are totally unpredictable. Hence, the 
form that a certain musical passage assumes has not to be 
detached from the generative—i.e., performative—context 
in which it is built up, accepted or refused and, potentially, 
developed. Moreover, it has not to be neglected the funda-
mental notion of interplay, that many scholars have deeply 
investigated,18 and the extreme consequences that this as-
pect may have on the difference between melodic and har-
monic sphere.
Let us examine a small example from Jazz at the Plaza, 
Straight no chaser.19 In this astonishing piece, played at 
an impressive speed, the harmonic scheme offered by the 
piano and the bass is soon completely de-structured, es-
pecially in Coltrane’s and Adderley’s solos. They play ex-
tremely fluid and ungraspable chromatic figures, creating 
a surreal atmosphere emphasized by the fact that in the 
central section of both solos the pianist stops playing, as if 
Bill Evans wanted them to perform more freely, without any 
rhythmic-harmonic comment. In this track is impossible to 
separate the melodic line from the harmonic framework, 
and this happens not only because in the middle of the 
piece there is no explicit harmony at all, but also because 
Coltrane and Adderley do not simply play a melody on a se-
quence of chords. The two saxophonists build an over-arch-
ing, dynamic and interactive layer which is neither melodic 
nor harmonic, but is able to widen the horizon between the 
two, until it completely fades away. 
 This little and partial analysis of Coltrane improvisation-
al style shows that the core of jazz creativity consists not 
in playing fixed and unchangeable licks along a harmonic 
background, but rather in making these patterns interact 
with all the elements of the performative situation: “the 
player will find that few tunes fit neatly into one formula 
or another but rather combine two or more formulas, of-
ten in modified form.” (Baker 1998, p. 27). This does not 
mean that spontaneity in jazz only lies in the sequencing 
and linking of different “formulas”, as Brown (1981, p. 354) 
writes.20 While performers juxtapose different licks, they 
transform them into something else, with their particular 
touch, developing in the best cases, an individual style. And 
in jazz music, which counts on the ability of single perform-
ers faced with relatively few and extremely famous reperto-
ries of standards, rather than on composers, their unique 
artworks and interpreters, building a style in accordance 
with a certain tradition, represents perhaps the most im-
portant aspect.21 The result of our analysis is then a dynam-
ic conception of the formula: we should not say that jazz 
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pieces are made of formulas, but rather that formulaic items 
regulate the musical discourse, allowing us to recognize the 
milestones it includes: i.e., in case of bebop, the chorus, the 
solos and the reprise (Brownell 1994). 
Nevertheless, our insisting on the fact that formulas are 
not fixed and petrified does not imply that jazz is an art 
form committed to a total anarchy. Several aesthetic inquir-
ies have highlighted the importance of normativity in this 
kind of music. Georg Bertram, for example, talks about a 
“normativity without norms,” (Bertram 2010, p. 36): i.e., 
in our terms, a context in which the link between different 
passages are not prescribed in advance, but are constantly 
exhibited, re-negotiated and renewed in every single per-
formative situation. As Alessandro Sbordoni notes, two 
complementary dimensions incessantly intertwining with 
one another are involved in the improvisational process-
es: the first one, that we may define as vertical, is about the 
relation between the productive imagination of the single 
artist and the musical material, whose result is a stand-
ing-out style. The second one, that we may term horizontal, 
includes the simultaneous and extemporaneous contribu-
tions of those who participate in the performance: through 
their reciprocal relations, it is possible to sketch the shared, 
productive and creative goals which make a performance 
successful.22 Here we are facing not an absolute lack of nor-
mativity, but only a different one, which does not pre-deter-
mine what notes should be played, but offers to performers 
a range of possibilities ready to explore. As Bertinetto writes 
(2014, p. 139), the peculiarity of jazz is not to reformulate 
its normative boundaries in all particular performances, 
so that they reflect, in a reduced scale, a historical develop-
ment typical of a musical genre. In every jazz performance, 
rather, this historical development is directly shown as the 
music goes on: jazz sessions are not pale mirrors of an ab-
stract artistic path: they tangibly exhibit a process where 
macro- and micro- levels never cease to intermingle.
V. MUSICAL ENTITIES WITH INFORMATIVE  
 MODELS. DIFFERENT RANGES OF  
 POSSIBILITIES
As we have just seen, jazz is far from being coextensive 
with a realm of absolute arbitrariness in which unchange-
able formulas are randomly put in a row. On the contrary, 
this musical practice exhibits a discourse whose bases are 
the constant mutation, reworking and rephrasing of some 
essential patterns, scales, modes or chord sequences. The 
simpler a formula, the easier it can be memorized by the 
performer and, possibly, reshaped to make it sound attrac-
tive to those who participate to the musical event—both 
the audience and the other performers. As has already been 
said, memory should not be underestimated, because it is 
only through this faculty that musicians can recover the 
most interesting passages throwing them into the perfor-
mance flow again. This opens up an important feature of 
jazz creativity: we will consider jazz having an informative 
model. What does it mean, and in what does it differ from 
the prescriptive model? 
A preliminary (and banal) observation that could be 
made is that a musician, in building a jazz performance, 
does not know in advance what will be played: not only be-
cause there is no written score (or, when there is one, it is 
handled with a considerable freedom),23 but also because 
jazz is not a tradition of re-performable works, at least in 
the sense typical of other kinds of music, such as western 
classical tradition and even folk. This might seem odd, since 
neither are there scores in folk music: but the goal of tra-
ditional oral music is to preserve the structure of a social 
practice as accurately as possible,24 not to produce original 
and interesting performance, and this could be achieved 
even in absence of scores. In other words, jazz uses a dif-
ferent kind of inscription of the musical text,25 neither com-
pletely based on western notation, nor on oral transmission. 
Hence, in the informative model, the form of the musical 
piece is determined from the inside layer, i.e. directly into 
the performative situation in which it takes place, and does 
not depend on an external entity, a pre-composed work of 
music. It coheres with the “theory of information” from 
which it takes its name,26 the informative model consists 
in a pattern which does not prescribe what pitches must be 
played, but offers a high rate of potential choices. Let us ana-
lyse this: it insists on the choices being made from the play-
ers, rather than on the structure of a text (written or not) 
that comes before the performance. The text of a jazz piece, 
therefore, is developed at the same time in which the main 
decisions on what in western music are called “expressive 
features” are made.27 In other words, to use Giannattasio’s 
terminology again, the shape given to the sound, which 
makes it rough, bright, delicate, growling and so on, is not 
a variant: i.e. an expressive, suprasegmental feature added 
(and, as a consequence, not essential) to a certain pitch,28 
but represents a formal and essential variation which di-
rectly constitutes the text. 
The peculiarity of such a model emerges if we compare it 
with Roman Ingarden’s perspective, one of the most wide-
spread theories dealing with the problem of identity of mu-
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sical works. A fundamental issue which Ingarden wants to 
investigate is why should a musical artwork be unique if it 
allows different renditions. The answer depends on his orig-
inal interpretation of the role of scores in musical practice: 
a notated text gives rise to different possibilities of instan-
tiating it, but to preserve the identity of a musical artwork 
through different performances Ingarden writes that these 
possibilities are extremely limited (Ingarden  1989, pp. 240-
241). This could be due to the fact that a written score, as 
Caporaletti (2005) argues, implicitly conveys a visual rep-
resentation of the musical piece for which it stands a score, 
in particular, identifies every sound frequence with a sym-
bol having an accurately measured, chronometric duration. 
It could be argued that visual representation of musical 
phenomena aims at strongly limiting and disciplining the 
paths through which the text has to be developed, because 
there is a perfect correspondence between a symbol (with a 
given duration) and a single sound frequence. This view  by 
musicologist Jean Molino, considerably reduces the impact 
of such a perspective:
We are so accustomed to the rationalization of the 
musical system that we believe that a note cannot be 
defined otherwise than on the basis of a precise fre-
quence value: before the rationalization of musical 
systems, their elements worked exactly as those of lin-
guistic systems still work nowadays, i.e. using all the 
ranges of variation allowed by the configuration of ev-
ery system (Molino 2005, p. 488).29
What is important to focus on in jazz practice is not the 
single note which has to be played with the appropriate nu-
ance, but rather a nebula of pitches that open up to the per-
former, again, a high rate of possible choices to be made in 
order to inform the musical piece. Thus, such a nebula of 
possible sounds has to be explored by the performer, and it 
is not possible to establish in advance a correct way to do it. 
This happens not because jazz is included in the oral tradi-
tion,30 but because of the conception of limit typical of this 
musical world. In jazz, the notion of limit is related to the 
way in which the text is built: i.e. to the core of the process 
that generates a tradition. It does not make sense to talk 
about “wrong notes” (Bertinetto  2014, pp. 122-132) in them-
selves, i.e., notes that are not prescribed by the score, or, to 
say it better, notes that are «melodically incoherent» with a 
harmonic framework that cannot be changed. Instead, we 
can say with Miles Davis that «there are no wrong notes in 
jazz. Only notes played in the wrong place. This is to say that 
musical pieces built through an informative model are able 
to dynamically modify the rules according to which a note 
could be wrong or not: i.e. inappropriate to be included in 
certain context, in a given moment, having this or that sty-
listic features.31 It could well happen, therefore, that a note 
played at a given moment E1 may sound wrong, while at E2 
the performer, changing for instance the chord underneath 
it, can make it right. Consequently, what in musical pieces 
are conceived through a prescriptive model, a mistake re-
mains a mistake, without possibility to erase or correct it, in 
musical pieces defined by an informative model a mistake 
becomes an occasion to in-form, to re-form the piece.32
As Stephen Davies says, jazz improvisation “aims at the 
presentation of real-time music making constrained only 
by the grammatical conventions of a style.” (Davies 2001, p. 
19). On the contrary, musical practices based on a prescrip-
tive model, such as western classical music or popular mu-
sic,33 place limits in order to exclude some notes from the 
content of the text itself, and the only rate of choice left to 
the interpreter concerns expressive aspects, the speed, and 
other secondary aspects.34 In this latter case, a limit traces a 
path which comes to a determinate sound frequence—that 
one, and not another—is eligible to take part into the mu-
sical text. In jazz, the limit is a frontier to cross, which does 
not open up the text itself, but rather a way of playing, a 
language,35 a stylistic tradition: i.e. the conditions to having 
a text at all. Furthermore, these conditions are always re-
visable and modifiable in the course of performance, which 
represents the place where jazz creativity can be conceived 
and, more precisely, practiced. 
NOTES
1 This obviously happens because comparative ontology 
uses the same cathegories of the traditional one. Some 
doubts about a similar practice can also be read in 
Kania 2014. 
2 See also the debate between Brown and Kania (Brown 
2011, 2012; Kania 2012). 
3 For a critical point of view on this model, see Bertinetto 
2012. For a limited validity of the type/token model see 
Alperson 1984.
4 This doesn’t seem true for the concept of performance 
which we will examine in the final part of this para-
graph.
5 I leave aside the issue of intentionality which is of 
fundamental importance in Ingarden’s theory, but it 
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would too long to deal with here. We will go back to 
Ingarden’s view in the last paragraph.
6 Wolterstorff (1987) writes that not every musical phe-
nomenon must be considered through the duality 
work/performance.
7 On the contrary, Peter Kivy embraces the so-called 
pure sonicism, in which every timbral aspect is au-
tomatically excluded from the definition of a musi-
cal artwork. These aspects are sharply re-evaluated in 
Levinson 1990, pp. 63-88, 77-78. 
8 Concerning the difference between avantgarde re-
search on improvisation and jazz practice see Sparti 
2007, pp. 182-207. 
9 An example of the perdurantism of this myth can be 
found in Brown 2000, pp. 111-125, 117-119. 
10 This can also be said of originality in general: see 
Pareyson 1966, pp. 25-32. 
11 We will see the extent to which the mastering material 
of different styles is important in jazz practice.
12 It is worth noting that our sense of model is slightly 
different from that of Caporaletti: he focuses on what 
elements give shape to the model, while the purpose of 
our dichotomy (prescriptive/informative) is to clarify 
the relation between the model and the musical text re-
sulting from that. 
13 For a general but effective view on this topic’s relation 
to jazz improvisation, see Gillespie 1991, pp. 147-164.
14 See for example the case of Chick Corea, who devel-
oped his improvisational style on Bud Powell’s licks, or 
that of Charlie Parker, who did the same using Lester 
Brown’s records. See Caporaletti 2005, p. 131.
15 On contrafacts, see Bertinetto 2013, pp. 101-132; 
Caporaletti 2005, p. 308.
16 “By acquiring facility with these formulas and commit-
ting them to memory, the player greatly eases the task 
of learning to improvise on new tunes” (Baker 1988, p. 
27). 
17 A similar view on improvisation can be found in Lewis 
2004, pp. 131-162). Here he distinguishes between the 
Eurological and Afrological approach to improvisa-
tion: while the former “insists on ephemerality”, the 
latter “considers improvisation in terms of re-appropri-
ation, reworking and transformation of received mate-
rials” (Bertinetto 2012, pp. 1-22).
18 For instance Monson 1996.
19 This track can be found in The Miles Davis Sextet, Jazz 
at The Plaza, Columbia 1958.
20 A critic against this view is Gushee 1981, pp. 151-169. 
21 See Davies 2001, p. 12; Baker 1979, pp. 1-2.  
22 A. Sbordoni, Comporre interattivo. Una valida pro-
spettiva, in Id. (a cura di), Improvvisazione oggi, LIM, 
Lucca 2014, pp. 89-95, pp. 90-91. 
23 Nevertheless, there are scholars who tend to deny that 
improvisation is the main feature of jazz music basing 
their claims on the fact that many jazz musicians such 
as Duke Ellington made a great deal of use of scores: 
see Chevan 1997; Knauer 1990, pp. 20-38.
24 See Arbo 2013, p. 27. 
25 On this notion, see Ferraris 2009, pp. 43-45.
26 Ingarden, 1989a, p. 67.
27 “The jazz improviser must grasp the information sup-
plied by the rhythm section to put syntactical order to 
the language statement, and grammar of the jazz solo” 
(Tirro 1974, p. 288).
28 See Caporaletti 2005, pp. 69-86, 98-115. Concerning 
the structural relevance that expressive features can ac-
quire in jazz music, see Brown 2011, p. 66; Kania 2011, 
p. 395.
29 “Nous sommes tellement habitués à la rationalisation 
du système musical que nous croyons qu’une note ne 
peut se définir que par la valeur exacte d’une fréquence 
: avant la rationalisation des systèmes musicaux, leurs 
unités fonctionnaient exactement comme fonctionnent 
encore les unites des systèmes linguistiques, c’est-à-dire 
en utilisant toutes les marges de variation premises par 
la configuration de chaque système”.
30 Molino attributes the high rate of potential choice 
which we talked about only to oral cultures. But we 
have to consider that even oral cultures can be consid-
erably binding (See Arbo 2013, p. 27). For critical re-
marks on the idea of including jazz in oral culture, see 
Caporaletti 2005, pp. 135-150.
31 See the interesting reflections on the notion of kairòs in 
Goldoni, 2013, p. 145.
32 For a clever insight into these problems, see Bertinetto 
forthcoming.
33 In this latter case, especially as far as lyrics are con-
cerned.
34 Cadenzas in classical music represent a partial excep-
tion (Brown 2011b, p. 59). Although, it is worth noting 
that in the presence of a cadenza improvisation is pre-
scribed, but it does not give rise to an informative mod-
el of creating music. See Bertinetto 2012b, p. 114. 
35 On the relation between jazz and ordinary conversa-
tion, see Monson 1996.
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